1. #1
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    24.532
    20-05-2006

    UAE, Egypt prepare for Haftar’s exit after loss of Wattiyah air base.

    Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, two of the principal backers of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and its commander, Khalifa Haftar, have decided to abandon the renegade general after more than a year of a failed military campaign to take Tripoli, according to Libyan and Egyptian officials.

    Egypt and the UAE have decided Haftar is “on his way out,” a Libyan political source close to the beleaguered general told Mada Masr today. An Egyptian official, who spoke to Mada Masr on condition of anonymity, echoed the Libyan political source’s account. “The question today for the Egypt-UAE-France alliance that has supported Haftar to this point is to decide on their next move in view of Haftar’s defeat,” the source says. “No one can bet on Haftar again.”

    The move comes as Haftar is losing internal support as well, with powerful tribes and political allies in Libya abandoning him.

    The withdrawal of support for Haftar comes after forces affiliated with the Government of National Accord (GNA) backed by Turkish airstrikes took control of the Wattiyah air base on Monday without any significant resistance from LNA forces.

    The loss of Wattiyah is the most significant setback since Haftar launched an assault on Tripoli in April 2019, with the backing of France, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan and Russia. The GNA has turned the tide in the war in Tripoli with support Turkey has provided since the start of the year. With Turkey deploying ever-increasing numbers of ethnically Turkish Syrian troops on the ground and drones in the skies, the GNA has dealt the LNA a series of setbacks since the start of April.

    A sign of the extent of the setback came in the early hours of Tuesday morning when LNA spokesperson Ahmed al-Mesmari held a press conference to announce a “redistribution and repositioning in the battlefronts, disengaging from some crowded residential areas” in the front to the south of Tripoli. Mesmari tried to distance the decision from the loss of Wattiyah, saying that Haftar had issued the “redistribution” order months ago based on a report from the head of the LNA’s western military region.

    Yet, Wattiyah had played a key role for Haftar, whose forces seized the air base in 2014, not only because it served as a key operations center for his assault on the Libyan capital but because it was one of the few former Libyan Air Force facilities spared from airstrikes in the 2011 NATO intervention, due the fact it had stored mostly decommissioned aircraft. Haftar had since restored many of the decommissioned jets to service.

    Without Wattiyah, the LNA’s closest air base is in Jufrah, some 490 km away from Tripoli in central Libya. The city of Tarhouna, 180 km southeast of Tripoli, is the LNA’s sole remaining stronghold for the assault on the capital. The GNA has launched several attacks on Tarhouna in the last month.

    The GNA’s seizure of the base happened suddenly on Monday morning, after an intensive air campaign by Turkish drones for weeks. A high-ranking GNA military source close to Osama al-Juwaili, who hails from the western city of Zintan and led the GNA forces attack on Wattiyah yesterday, told Mada Masr yesterday that the attack was carried out in coordination with Zintani forces aligned with Haftar inside the air base.

    Juwaili persuaded two main groups inside the base to withdraw before the GNA forces advanced, according to the source, who pointed to the GNA’s air superiority in having conducted over 60 airstrikes in the last month as a key factor in draining the forces inside the base. “[The desertion in Wattiyah] shows a loss of confidence among armed groups loyal to Haftar and in his ability to change the situation on the ground,” the source said.

    After GNA forces took the air base, they posted images online of what they claimed were captured Russian-made Pantsir air defense systems mounted on trucks as well as manuals on how to use the equipment.

    verder lezen.
    https://mada24.appspot.com/madamasr....iyah-air-base/
    het is gedaan met hafter de terrorist..

  2. #2
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    285
    21-04-2020

    Al veranderen ze leiding gevende gewoon de jihad doorzetten tot geheel Libië onder GNA controle is. Sisi weet dat zijn einde inzicht is. Moslimbroeders in Egypte zullen bewapend worden vanuit Libische grondgebied.

  3. #3
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    285
    21-04-2020

    It’s Turkey’s Libya now

    European countries should try to revive the political approach to resolving the Libya conflict, particularly given that Turkey may want to do so from its current position of strength.

    Libya doesn’t do incremental change, it seems. Instead, the country oscillates between agonising stalemate and complete upheaval. The past month – and recent days, in particular – has been one of those moments of transformation: Turkish military support has driven the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to sweeping victories that have effectively killed off Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s hopes of conquering Tripoli, while creating significant fractures within his camp. As Turkey grows more assertive and stamps its authority on Libya, Europeans need to use these shifting dynamics to create a new political reality in Libya – one that might finally have a chance of success, given his dramatically weakened position.

    The GNA has built its recent military victories, which have reclaimed nearly all of western Libya from Haftar’s forces, around the support of Turkish air defence systems and a drone campaign targeting Haftar’s bases and supply lines. Having lost all towns on the coast and the key airbase of Wutiya in rapid succession, Haftar’s operation now appears to be fatally wounded. Unless he can regain air superiority, he will only continue to lose.

    Turkey’s new assertiveness is a direct result of the failure of the Berlin conference held in January. The German initiative was designed to align international actors on a political route out of the morass in Libya, but it did little to deter the United Arab Emirates’ massive mobilisation in support of Haftar. Ankara has now demonstrated a firm intent to remove Haftar from Tripoli and its environs. Turkey’s Libya intervention appears to be following Russia’s Syria playbook – from the legitimising act of a formal invitation that had parliamentary approval (in stark contrast to the covert intervention of all other states involved in the war) to its exploitation of divisions between European countries whenever it felt threatened by them. Turkey’s influence is evident in the assertiveness with which the GNA has taken Europe to task over the perceived pro-Haftar bias of IRINI, the European naval operation to enforce to the UN arms embargo on Libya. Malta’s shock decision to veto the allocation of EU funds to the operation is likely a product of Turkish influence and the promise of greater controls on emigration from Libya.

    But, despite the GNA’s sweeping gains in the past month, the war is far from over. Haftar’s forces still launch missile attacks on Tripoli each day and control Libya’s oil. They will remain difficult to displace from Tarhouna (their last stronghold in western Libya) unless the GNA engages with the town diplomatically. Much will now depend on the response from the UAE and Haftar’s other key external backers, which have continued to increase their mercenary deployments and arms shipments in an effort to check Turkish ascendancy.

    Critically, however, the setbacks Haftar faces extend beyond the military realm, signalling that a more profound realignment may be under way. His failures in the west have caused notable fractures within his camp in the south and east, aggravating discontent over his year-long war, its costly toll, and its general lack of direction. Haftar’s response to this discontent was to launch what was effectively a coup: he annulled the Libyan Political Agreement, which forms the basis of Libya’s political institutions, and claimed full control. But this brazen power grab only seems to have further alienated important constituencies in southern Libya, which responded by declaring their allegiance to the GNA, while eastern tribes continue to hedge their bets.

    Significantly, Russia – which like the UAE has been a key backer of Haftar – also seems to be reassessing its position. Moscow played a key role in instigating a new initiative by Aguila Saleh, the speaker of parliament, to advance his own political process. This gambit demonstrated a loss of faith in Haftar, because it seeks to strengthen another prominent figure in eastern Libya at his expense.

    Saleh’s proposal, which is based on the reorganisation of the GNA cabinet, is unlikely to be successful. But it is important as an opener to negotiations between eastern and western Libya in a new format that would reduce Haftar’s importance, as well as his capacity to act as a spoiler. Egypt, another backer of Haftar, will likely support this approach, as it has grown tired of his determination to wage war in Tripoli at the expense of all else. These diplomatic shifts will not only meaningfully impact Haftar but could also put renewed pressure on the UAE to temper its maximalist support for him, lest it becomes isolated on the issue.

    Amid these dynamics, there may finally be an opportunity for some political progress – which has been blocked in the past year by, more than anything, the intransigence of Haftar and his external backers, who seemed to truly believe that total military victory was in sight. This dream is now dead. With Haftar on the ropes and his backers potentially looking for other options, European countries should try to revive the political approach to resolving the conflict, particularly given that Turkey may want to do so from its current position of strength. The GNA’s symbolically important capture of Wutiya creates an opening to push both sides and their foreign backers towards a mutual compromise and a ceasefire, in which Haftar and his aligned forces from Tarhouna would withdraw from Tripoli’s suburbs in exchange for the GNA halting an attack on Tarhouna. Given that the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ spokesman, Ahmed al-Mesmari,*announced*that the group would disengage from “some crowded residential areas”, it should now be held to that commitment.*

    Europeans should not miss this slender opportunity to put Libya on a better track. Failure will not only condemn Europe to a prolonged conflict on its doorstep but will also marginalise it further as Turkish influence in Libya grows, complicating the proxy war. Europe’s capacity to act in Libya will fundamentally depend on its political will to acknowledge and respond to the reality on the ground. For the likes of France and Greece (the latter of which only joined the Haftar camp in recent months), now is the time to recognise that their interests will not be served by continuing their current path. Other European states – particularly Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom – should press France and Greece to escape Haftar’s sinking ship. This could allow Europeans to work more forcefully through the United Nations to create a patchwork of local deals, building on recent Libyan initiatives that bring together warring communities in western Libya while using Saleh’s initiative to restart the Geneva dialogue between Libya’s political factions.

    Europe’s window of opportunity in Libya is closing. It needs to move fast if it is to forcefully protect its interests and its role as a barrier against Russian encroachment into the country, while preventing the development of another Syria-style conflict in its neighbourhood.


    https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commenta...keys_libya_now

  4. #4
    Hear my Roar, GRRR ⵣ

    Reacties
    1.860
    20-01-2015

    Citaat Geplaatst door Bindullah Bekijk reactie
    It’s Turkey’s Libya now

    European countries should try to revive the political approach to resolving the Libya conflict, particularly given that Turkey may want to do so from its current position of strength.

    Libya doesn’t do incremental change, it seems. Instead, the country oscillates between agonising stalemate and complete upheaval. The past month – and recent days, in particular – has been one of those moments of transformation: Turkish military support has driven the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to sweeping victories that have effectively killed off Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s hopes of conquering Tripoli, while creating significant fractures within his camp. As Turkey grows more assertive and stamps its authority on Libya, Europeans need to use these shifting dynamics to create a new political reality in Libya – one that might finally have a chance of success, given his dramatically weakened position.

    The GNA has built its recent military victories, which have reclaimed nearly all of western Libya from Haftar’s forces, around the support of Turkish air defence systems and a drone campaign targeting Haftar’s bases and supply lines. Having lost all towns on the coast and the key airbase of Wutiya in rapid succession, Haftar’s operation now appears to be fatally wounded. Unless he can regain air superiority, he will only continue to lose.

    Turkey’s new assertiveness is a direct result of the failure of the Berlin conference held in January. The German initiative was designed to align international actors on a political route out of the morass in Libya, but it did little to deter the United Arab Emirates’ massive mobilisation in support of Haftar. Ankara has now demonstrated a firm intent to remove Haftar from Tripoli and its environs. Turkey’s Libya intervention appears to be following Russia’s Syria playbook – from the legitimising act of a formal invitation that had parliamentary approval (in stark contrast to the covert intervention of all other states involved in the war) to its exploitation of divisions between European countries whenever it felt threatened by them. Turkey’s influence is evident in the assertiveness with which the GNA has taken Europe to task over the perceived pro-Haftar bias of IRINI, the European naval operation to enforce to the UN arms embargo on Libya. Malta’s shock decision to veto the allocation of EU funds to the operation is likely a product of Turkish influence and the promise of greater controls on emigration from Libya.

    But, despite the GNA’s sweeping gains in the past month, the war is far from over. Haftar’s forces still launch missile attacks on Tripoli each day and control Libya’s oil. They will remain difficult to displace from Tarhouna (their last stronghold in western Libya) unless the GNA engages with the town diplomatically. Much will now depend on the response from the UAE and Haftar’s other key external backers, which have continued to increase their mercenary deployments and arms shipments in an effort to check Turkish ascendancy.

    Critically, however, the setbacks Haftar faces extend beyond the military realm, signalling that a more profound realignment may be under way. His failures in the west have caused notable fractures within his camp in the south and east, aggravating discontent over his year-long war, its costly toll, and its general lack of direction. Haftar’s response to this discontent was to launch what was effectively a coup: he annulled the Libyan Political Agreement, which forms the basis of Libya’s political institutions, and claimed full control. But this brazen power grab only seems to have further alienated important constituencies in southern Libya, which responded by declaring their allegiance to the GNA, while eastern tribes continue to hedge their bets.

    Significantly, Russia – which like the UAE has been a key backer of Haftar – also seems to be reassessing its position. Moscow played a key role in instigating a new initiative by Aguila Saleh, the speaker of parliament, to advance his own political process. This gambit demonstrated a loss of faith in Haftar, because it seeks to strengthen another prominent figure in eastern Libya at his expense.

    Saleh’s proposal, which is based on the reorganisation of the GNA cabinet, is unlikely to be successful. But it is important as an opener to negotiations between eastern and western Libya in a new format that would reduce Haftar’s importance, as well as his capacity to act as a spoiler. Egypt, another backer of Haftar, will likely support this approach, as it has grown tired of his determination to wage war in Tripoli at the expense of all else. These diplomatic shifts will not only meaningfully impact Haftar but could also put renewed pressure on the UAE to temper its maximalist support for him, lest it becomes isolated on the issue.

    Amid these dynamics, there may finally be an opportunity for some political progress – which has been blocked in the past year by, more than anything, the intransigence of Haftar and his external backers, who seemed to truly believe that total military victory was in sight. This dream is now dead. With Haftar on the ropes and his backers potentially looking for other options, European countries should try to revive the political approach to resolving the conflict, particularly given that Turkey may want to do so from its current position of strength. The GNA’s symbolically important capture of Wutiya creates an opening to push both sides and their foreign backers towards a mutual compromise and a ceasefire, in which Haftar and his aligned forces from Tarhouna would withdraw from Tripoli’s suburbs in exchange for the GNA halting an attack on Tarhouna. Given that the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ spokesman, Ahmed al-Mesmari,*announced*that the group would disengage from “some crowded residential areas”, it should now be held to that commitment.*

    Europeans should not miss this slender opportunity to put Libya on a better track. Failure will not only condemn Europe to a prolonged conflict on its doorstep but will also marginalise it further as Turkish influence in Libya grows, complicating the proxy war. Europe’s capacity to act in Libya will fundamentally depend on its political will to acknowledge and respond to the reality on the ground. For the likes of France and Greece (the latter of which only joined the Haftar camp in recent months), now is the time to recognise that their interests will not be served by continuing their current path. Other European states – particularly Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom – should press France and Greece to escape Haftar’s sinking ship. This could allow Europeans to work more forcefully through the United Nations to create a patchwork of local deals, building on recent Libyan initiatives that bring together warring communities in western Libya while using Saleh’s initiative to restart the Geneva dialogue between Libya’s political factions.

    Europe’s window of opportunity in Libya is closing. It needs to move fast if it is to forcefully protect its interests and its role as a barrier against Russian encroachment into the country, while preventing the development of another Syria-style conflict in its neighbourhood.


    https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commenta...keys_libya_now
    Grootheidswaanzin, exact wat we de afgelopen dagen zeiden. blijf maar weg
    vooruit kijken is regeren.

  5. #5
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    457
    26-02-2020

    alwatiyah hete niet lang geleden 3oqbat ibn nafi3 , man die islam bracht naar noord afrika,


    haftar heeft meer dan 90% van libie in handen, hou op met je jullie achterlijkheid.

  6. #6
    MAT

    Reacties
    5.504
    02-09-2019

    Tripoli regering blijft maar terrein winnen.

    De harde clash zal worden uitgevochten in Tobruk en Benghazi.
    Haftars hoofdkwartier.

    Oosten van Libie wordt een keiharde confrontatie.

  7. #7
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    24.532
    20-05-2006

    Citaat Geplaatst door chelhie21 Bekijk reactie
    Grootheidswaanzin, exact wat we de afgelopen dagen zeiden. blijf maar weg
    je hebt zeker alleen het onderwerp gelezen..

  8. #8
    MAT

    Reacties
    5.504
    02-09-2019

    Hypocrieten in Kremlin vragen om staakt het vuren in Libie ivm met ramadan.

    Schijnheiligerds.

    Dit is puur vragen om tijdwinst voor hergroepering en mobilisering troepen Haftar.

  9. #9
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    24.532
    20-05-2006

    Citaat Geplaatst door Maaffia Bekijk reactie
    Hypocrieten in Kremlin vragen om staat het vuren in Libie ivm met ramadan.

    Schijnheiligerds.

    Dit is puur om de troepen van Haftar te hergroeperen en te mobiliseren.
    dat gaat niet gebeuren..

  10. #10
    MAT

    Reacties
    5.504
    02-09-2019

    Tripoli regering boekt vandaag ook successen. Haftar is spoorloos.

  11. #11
    MAT

    Reacties
    5.504
    02-09-2019

    Beelden van dode Russische huurling Wagner in de laatste strijd.

  12. #12
    MVC Lid

    Reacties
    4.468
    26-03-2016

    Goed dat Marokko afstand heeft gehouden van die coalitie, zou meer betrekkingen met Turkije moeten herzien voor meer wapens etc.