larroussi24
15-11-2007, 09:23
In oktober 2001 vond in Parijs een vriendschappelijke wedstrijd plaats tussen de nationale voetbalelftallen van Frankrijk en Algerije. Deze sportieve ontmoeting tussen de voormalige koloniale bezetter en de voormalige Noord-Afrikaanse kolonie zou een belangrijke symbolische betekenis moeten krijgen voor de Algerijnse gemeenschap in Frankrijk. Tegen de achtergrond van de conflictueuze relaties tussen beiden landen - gemarkeerd door de eeuwenlange Franse overheersing, de Algerijnse onafhankelijkheidsoorlog, de Algerijnse burgeroorlog van de jaren negentig en het voortdurende racisme tegen Noord-Afrikanen in Frankrijk - zou deze wedstrijd een stap vooruit kunnen vormen voor de erkenning van de transnationale Algerijnse gemeenschap en een basis kunnen leggen voor de overbrugging van maatschappelijke tegenstellingen tussen Fransen en Algerijnen.
Volgens de Fransen was het voetbal bij uitstek een middel om de ontspoorde jeugd aan te spreken en weer te betrekken bij de Franse samenleving. Via het nationale voetbalelftal kon Frankrijk laten zien dat een gevoel van nationale trots mogelijk was ondanks bestaande raciale, culturele en etnische verschillen. Dat idee was met name gegroeid tijdens de wereldkampioenschappen voetbal drie jaar eerder. De televisiebeelden van duizenden supporters van divers pluimage die op de Champs- Elysées gezamenlijk 'hun' nationale team naar de wereldtitel schreeuwden, werden geïnterpreteerd als de footage van een nieuwe Franse Revolutie. De verschillen tussen 'black', 'blanc' en 'beur' konden overbrugd worden wanneer iedereen zich opstelde achter het rood-wit-blauw van het nationale tenue. Met deze hervonden nationale eenheid was Frankrijk in staat tot grootste prestaties, niet alleen op het voetbalveld maar ook daarbuiten. De succesvolle integratie van Afrikaanse migranten en hun nakomelingen in de Franse natie werd symbolisch belichaamd door voetbalsterren zoals David Trezeguet, Christian Karembeu, Marcel Desailly, Thierry Henry en Zinedine Zidane. Zij bewezen door hun populariteit het ongelijk van de extreemrechtse leider Jean Marie Le Pen, die beweerde dat de Fransen zich niet meer konden herkennen in dit multiculturele en multiraciale elftal van voetballers 'die niet eens de Marseillaise konden zingen'.
De vriendschappelijke wedstrijd in 2001 die de hervonden nationale eenheid verder had moeten belichamen liep uit op een drama. Onder het toeziend oog van de Franse politieke elites en televisiekijkers, verstoorden Algerijnse jongeren uit de Parijse banlieus met hun boegeroep en gefluit het Franse volkslied. De wedstrijd kon niet uitgespeeld worden omdat jongeren met Algerijnse vlaggen het veld bestormden. De Franse pers en het establishment reageerden geschokt. De acties van de jongeren werden gezien als illustratief voor de mislukte integratie en voor de diepgewortelde haat van Algerijnse jongeren tegen Frankrijk. [1]
ZIE HIERONDER HET RAPPORT VAN DE FRANSE BOND AAN DE FIFA
Composition of the Committee: Marcel Mathier, chairman (SUI), Moustapha Saleck Kamara (MTN), Jan Peeters (BEL)
I. Summary of Facts
The reports from the referee and the match commissioner indicate that the match France – Algeria was interrupted in the 76th minute following a pitch invasion by supporters. This was confirmed by the video recordings of the match.
Responding to an invitation by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (hereinafter: the Committee) to submit their observations of the incident, the French Football Federation (hereinafter: FFF) replied on 23 October 2001. In these observations, the FFF does not deny the incident as indicated in the referee’s report, but makes the following statements:
- This match was arranged one year ago as part of political attempts by both governments to reconcile the peoples of both countries.
- The terrorist attacks in the New York on September 11 and the incidents that occurred as a result had enflamed the situation in the French towns and areas of Paris that are home to many young Algerian immigrants.
- It would not have been possible to postpone the match in the wake of September 11 as such a step may have been misinterpreted.
- In addition to the usual technical measures in place (such as video surveillance), the FFF had also taken the following steps: the number of stewards was increased from 800 to 1,200, with the number of police officers increased from 200 to 1,250.
- “Although almost 50,000 fans of Algerian nationality/origin were present in the stadium,” the match progressed according to plan.
II. Law
In pursuance of article 44 of the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee can impose sanctions on national associations, clubs and officials who contravene the Statutes, regulations and rulings of FIFA.
After studying the information at its disposal, the Committee decided that:
1. Although this case refers to a friendly match, pursuant to art. 19 par. 3 of the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes, the Committee is authorised to rule on this case as a pitch invasion, and the danger it poses for the players and everybody present, is a “serious infringement” as laid down in the wording of this article.
2. While determining the level of responsibility of the FFF, the Committee also has to consider whether the security measures and their implementation were sufficient to prevent a pitch invasion, as well as whether the FFF did in fact take all of the measures that were to be expected in such a situation.
According to chapter III section 3.3 of the FIFA Disciplinary Procedure, and the “Hausrecht/home” principle, the host team, or the host association, is responsible for safety and order within the stadium and its surrounding area before, during and after the match. As such, the association can be held responsible for all incidents that occur there, regardless of the identity of the individual culprit.
The obligation to guarantee the highest possible level of security means that, in terms of the dangers posed by spectators, the organiser must take the following into account:- The greater number of spectators, as the greater the number of spectators, the greater the risk of the individuals in a crowd committing acts that they perhaps would not have committed in isolation (Journal des Tribunaux, 1989, p.699).
- The general climate in which the match is played, as the greater the tension, the greater the risk of problems occurring during the match.
- The socio-economic context.
3. The appropriateness of the precautionary measures implemented by an organiser is to be assessed in view of the nature of the potential danger, and in particular of its foreseeable nature. In this case, the potential danger turned into reality. The more it is possible to foresee potential dangerous situations, the more important it is for security measures to be increased, stricter and more efficient.
With regard to this particular case, it should be recalled that according to the submitted observations, the FFF was aware of the tension surrounding the tragic events in the United States on September 11 and the related implications in the French suburbs home to many Algerian immigrants. This fact alone was indicative of a high-tension match and as a result, the FFF should have ensured that stringent, efficient measures were in place.
Instead, the FFF, if one is to believe the unsubstantiated claims in the submitted observations, merely increased the number of stewards from 800 to 1,200 and the number of police officers from 200 to 1,250. However, it should be recalled that the majority of these police officers were stationed outside of the stadium, a fact that delayed their intervention. Had these officers been stationed inside the stadium, their presence may have prevented the pitch invasion. This suggestion is backed up by the FFF, who said: “ (&hellip
Furthermore, video recordings of the incidents clearly reveal that a number of spectators were in possession of dangerous objects that could be used as weapons, such as sharpened wooden sticks, for example. The Committee therefore concluded that the spectators were not searched correctly – a further example of shortcomings that can be attributed to the FFF. Although, as far as we are aware, there were no serious incidents involving the use of these “weapons”, it is clear that the FFF was not in full control of a situation that could have had serious repercussions for the players, officials and the 50,000 spectators.
4.
Volgens de Fransen was het voetbal bij uitstek een middel om de ontspoorde jeugd aan te spreken en weer te betrekken bij de Franse samenleving. Via het nationale voetbalelftal kon Frankrijk laten zien dat een gevoel van nationale trots mogelijk was ondanks bestaande raciale, culturele en etnische verschillen. Dat idee was met name gegroeid tijdens de wereldkampioenschappen voetbal drie jaar eerder. De televisiebeelden van duizenden supporters van divers pluimage die op de Champs- Elysées gezamenlijk 'hun' nationale team naar de wereldtitel schreeuwden, werden geïnterpreteerd als de footage van een nieuwe Franse Revolutie. De verschillen tussen 'black', 'blanc' en 'beur' konden overbrugd worden wanneer iedereen zich opstelde achter het rood-wit-blauw van het nationale tenue. Met deze hervonden nationale eenheid was Frankrijk in staat tot grootste prestaties, niet alleen op het voetbalveld maar ook daarbuiten. De succesvolle integratie van Afrikaanse migranten en hun nakomelingen in de Franse natie werd symbolisch belichaamd door voetbalsterren zoals David Trezeguet, Christian Karembeu, Marcel Desailly, Thierry Henry en Zinedine Zidane. Zij bewezen door hun populariteit het ongelijk van de extreemrechtse leider Jean Marie Le Pen, die beweerde dat de Fransen zich niet meer konden herkennen in dit multiculturele en multiraciale elftal van voetballers 'die niet eens de Marseillaise konden zingen'.
De vriendschappelijke wedstrijd in 2001 die de hervonden nationale eenheid verder had moeten belichamen liep uit op een drama. Onder het toeziend oog van de Franse politieke elites en televisiekijkers, verstoorden Algerijnse jongeren uit de Parijse banlieus met hun boegeroep en gefluit het Franse volkslied. De wedstrijd kon niet uitgespeeld worden omdat jongeren met Algerijnse vlaggen het veld bestormden. De Franse pers en het establishment reageerden geschokt. De acties van de jongeren werden gezien als illustratief voor de mislukte integratie en voor de diepgewortelde haat van Algerijnse jongeren tegen Frankrijk. [1]
ZIE HIERONDER HET RAPPORT VAN DE FRANSE BOND AAN DE FIFA
Composition of the Committee: Marcel Mathier, chairman (SUI), Moustapha Saleck Kamara (MTN), Jan Peeters (BEL)
I. Summary of Facts
The reports from the referee and the match commissioner indicate that the match France – Algeria was interrupted in the 76th minute following a pitch invasion by supporters. This was confirmed by the video recordings of the match.
Responding to an invitation by the FIFA Disciplinary Committee (hereinafter: the Committee) to submit their observations of the incident, the French Football Federation (hereinafter: FFF) replied on 23 October 2001. In these observations, the FFF does not deny the incident as indicated in the referee’s report, but makes the following statements:
- This match was arranged one year ago as part of political attempts by both governments to reconcile the peoples of both countries.
- The terrorist attacks in the New York on September 11 and the incidents that occurred as a result had enflamed the situation in the French towns and areas of Paris that are home to many young Algerian immigrants.
- It would not have been possible to postpone the match in the wake of September 11 as such a step may have been misinterpreted.
- In addition to the usual technical measures in place (such as video surveillance), the FFF had also taken the following steps: the number of stewards was increased from 800 to 1,200, with the number of police officers increased from 200 to 1,250.
- “Although almost 50,000 fans of Algerian nationality/origin were present in the stadium,” the match progressed according to plan.
II. Law
In pursuance of article 44 of the FIFA Statutes, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee can impose sanctions on national associations, clubs and officials who contravene the Statutes, regulations and rulings of FIFA.
After studying the information at its disposal, the Committee decided that:
1. Although this case refers to a friendly match, pursuant to art. 19 par. 3 of the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes, the Committee is authorised to rule on this case as a pitch invasion, and the danger it poses for the players and everybody present, is a “serious infringement” as laid down in the wording of this article.
2. While determining the level of responsibility of the FFF, the Committee also has to consider whether the security measures and their implementation were sufficient to prevent a pitch invasion, as well as whether the FFF did in fact take all of the measures that were to be expected in such a situation.
According to chapter III section 3.3 of the FIFA Disciplinary Procedure, and the “Hausrecht/home” principle, the host team, or the host association, is responsible for safety and order within the stadium and its surrounding area before, during and after the match. As such, the association can be held responsible for all incidents that occur there, regardless of the identity of the individual culprit.
The obligation to guarantee the highest possible level of security means that, in terms of the dangers posed by spectators, the organiser must take the following into account:- The greater number of spectators, as the greater the number of spectators, the greater the risk of the individuals in a crowd committing acts that they perhaps would not have committed in isolation (Journal des Tribunaux, 1989, p.699).
- The general climate in which the match is played, as the greater the tension, the greater the risk of problems occurring during the match.
- The socio-economic context.
3. The appropriateness of the precautionary measures implemented by an organiser is to be assessed in view of the nature of the potential danger, and in particular of its foreseeable nature. In this case, the potential danger turned into reality. The more it is possible to foresee potential dangerous situations, the more important it is for security measures to be increased, stricter and more efficient.
With regard to this particular case, it should be recalled that according to the submitted observations, the FFF was aware of the tension surrounding the tragic events in the United States on September 11 and the related implications in the French suburbs home to many Algerian immigrants. This fact alone was indicative of a high-tension match and as a result, the FFF should have ensured that stringent, efficient measures were in place.
Instead, the FFF, if one is to believe the unsubstantiated claims in the submitted observations, merely increased the number of stewards from 800 to 1,200 and the number of police officers from 200 to 1,250. However, it should be recalled that the majority of these police officers were stationed outside of the stadium, a fact that delayed their intervention. Had these officers been stationed inside the stadium, their presence may have prevented the pitch invasion. This suggestion is backed up by the FFF, who said: “ (&hellip
Furthermore, video recordings of the incidents clearly reveal that a number of spectators were in possession of dangerous objects that could be used as weapons, such as sharpened wooden sticks, for example. The Committee therefore concluded that the spectators were not searched correctly – a further example of shortcomings that can be attributed to the FFF. Although, as far as we are aware, there were no serious incidents involving the use of these “weapons”, it is clear that the FFF was not in full control of a situation that could have had serious repercussions for the players, officials and the 50,000 spectators.
4.