oem_mujahid2
11-10-2006, 18:32
The Islamic Debate over Democracy: Al-Qaeda's Response to Hamas’ Victory
The Islamic Debate over Democracy: Jihadi Responses to Hamas’ Victory in the Palestinian Elections
Introduction
Hamas’ surprising victory in the recent Palestinian parliamentary elections—the first democratic elections to date—have raised a number of questions, not least due to the steep rate of the movement’s success and its sheer unstoppable rise to power. These questions relate to Hamas’ future policy, the next developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the very existence of the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, it seems that Hamas itself is unprepared to handle such an overwhelming victory, and there are signs that the need to compose the Palestinian government by itself with no significant partners puts the movement before significant challenges.
Hamas’ success of in free elections should be viewed as a landmark event taking place within the context of the highly-developed Palestinian public opinion, pluralism, and sense of democracy—a political culture quite unique in the Arab region. The elections were also regarded as another step in the U.S. campaign for the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, in line with the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, the
parliamentary elections in Iraq, and the U.S. pressures towards the parliamentary elections in Egypt.
The democratic process in the Arab world began in 1992 with the first free elections in Algeria, in which the Islamic front of FIS won the majority. This was followed by elections in Jordan, where the Islamic Action Front of the Muslim Brotherhood seized over one third of the seats. The Egyptian elections in December 2005, meanwhile, strengthened the power of the Muslim Brotherhood there, despite the substantial efforts by the authorities to limit the Brotherhood’s potential power by means of massive waves of arrests and policies of intimidation. The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood—the Islamic Party—supported the elections in Iraq, despite the controversy over them in the Sunni community, and the many attacks against its members and its platform by the various Jihadi insurgent groups.
In the past fifteen years it has become almost an axiom to say that free democratic elections in the Arab world give rises to the Islamic elements vis-à-vis the nationalist ones. One of the primary reasons for that is the ideological vacuum in the Arab world, where Islamism, especially that extolled by the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, is the only ideology left. In addition, Arab governments and publics find themselves in a crisis as illustrated by a sense of social injustice perpetuated by the ruling classes, as well as almost apocalyptic sense in the course of which the old Brotherhood’s slogan—Islam is the ultimate solution (al-Islam hua al-Hall)—has infiltrated large segments of Arab societies. Thus far, the Palestinian elections seem to close the circle of a process that started in Algeria, in which Islamic movements defeated liberation movements through democratic means, as illustrated by the Algerian FLN and the Palestinian PLO/Fatah.
Al-Qaeda and Hamas
The democratic elections in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority, the semi-democratic elections in Egypt, and especially the role of the United States on one hand and of the Brotherhood on the other, have also generated controversy and an ambivalence over the attitude towards “Western” democracy among Jihadi-Salafi circles too. Moreover, Al-Qaeda, global Jihad, or Jihadi Salafiyyah, pose a threat not only to the West or to local governments, but also to mainstream Arab Islamic movements belonging to the school of the Brotherhood. In the case of Iraq, Jihadis seem, as of now to have a consensus against the participation in the democratic processes, no matter what form this process may take on. That said, the success of Hamas—a Jihadi movement, even if focused locally and only against Israel—has posted some question marks.
These question marks are not new but rather a product of ongoing ambivalence towards Hamas in the past three to four years.1 On one hand, Hamas has conducted most of the terrorist activity against “the Jewish State” while adhering to Jihadi tenets. It also served as a model of Jihadi sacrifice in the form of the suicide bombings and its martyrs (Shuhada). On the other hand, however, Hamas has been viewed as part of Palestinian nationalism, conducting a “Jihad for the Homeland” instead of a “Jihad for Allah.” For many supporters of global Jihad, Hamas is also an obstacle in the way of infiltration of Al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Authority. It is a movement that cooperates with Shi`i Iran and Hizballah; that defended Yaser Arafat until his death in November 2004; and that, more recently has shown signs of regression in its policy by accepting and keeping its promise of a period of truce with Israel. Hamas is also an integral part of the Muslim Brotherhood, a harsh rival in the eyes of Jihadi-Salafists, with a political and social doctrine that we might call “evolution, not revolution.” The Brotherhood also has a strong tendency to support, at least tactically, democratic processes in the Arab world in which its prospects to win look promising.
Jihadi-Salafiyyah and Democracy
Islam’s interaction with democracy is of key importance for Jihadi-Salafi groups since opposing democracy in the Western form in general, and rejecting man-made laws in favor of the principle of Divine Law in particular, is perceived as a sacred doctrine. Power derived from human beings rather than from Allah is an obvious heresy—Kufr. In recent years, the question of the legitimacy of elections became more controversial as more and more Muslims living in the West too questioned the religious legitimacy of participating in Western elections. Books on this topic, especially those opposing participation of Muslims in democratic processes, are now translated by Salafi scholars and groups into English.2 Given the American campaign to bring democracy to the Arab world, Jihadi-Salafi groups view democracy not only as a heresy, but also as an integral part of the new “Crusader” campaign of colonialism—al-Hamlah al-Salibiyyah al-Jadidah—and the historical conspiracy against the Muslim world. This worldview is supported by more moderate Islamic elements in the Arab world, especially Saudi and Egyptian mainstream clerics and scholars, and has also been controversial also around the recent Iraqi elections.
We should also bear in mind that democracy is also a threatening prospect for most Arab governments, be they kingdoms or republics. Conservative nationalist scholars perceive democracy in terms of “Western political-cultural imperialism,” a heritage of past periods where the Soviet Union and Arab socialism have been influential in the region. Furthermore, in many Arab countries, where Islamic movements are leading the opposition and hence, are oppressed, they are also the leading advocates for civil rights, starting from the Algerian FIS to the Saudi Islamic reform movement.
There are several famous Jihadi-Salafi edicts—fatwas—have been issued against democracy and parliamentary elections. Supporters of global Jihad have made intensive use of these fatwas in order to criticize the Palestinian elections in general and Hamas’ participation in particular. On 18 January 2006, the webmaster of Al-Maqrizi Center in London, which is headed by the Egyptian Islamist Dr. Hani al-Siba`i, posted on the Jihadi forum Al-Hesbah a list of names of 102 Islamic clerics, some of whom are already dead. All of them severely opposed any participation in parliamentary elections in the Muslim world.3 The list was meant to influence the Palestinian Hamas not to take part in the elections. The list featured the names of 52 Egyptians, 22 Saudis, 5 Jordanians (among them “Sheikh” Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi), 5 Syrians, 4 Moroccans, two Sudanese, two Lebanese, two Kuwaitis, as well as one Iraqi, Nigerian, Mauritanian, and Yemeni each. The dominant share of Egyptians and Saudis reflects their significant role in the development of Jihadi Salafiyyah, as a result of the integration between Egyptian exiles from the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi scholars there.
Four were Palestinians, with no links to Hamas or the Brotherhood, among them two interesting individuals—Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani and Abd al-Qadim Zaloum, the founders and first two leaders of the Islamic Liberation Party (Tahrir Party). Another past Tahriri leader—Ahmad al-Da`our—is listed among the Jordanian clerics. This is interesting because in the debate over the elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, supporters of Jihadi-Salafiyyah for the first time bestowed a sense of legitimacy on the Tahrir Party and its positions against democracy and elections. In recent weeks, the Tahrir Party has published and distributed several pamphlets in the Palestinian Authority and on its web sites, calling for the boycott of the Palestinian elections, as well as those in Iraq. Several prominent members of the party took part in the debates in Jihadi forums and were welcomed for their stance regarding elections.
The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) Herzliya, ISRAEL http://www.e-prism.org 5
The Islamic Debate over Democracy: Jihadi Responses to Hamas’ Victory in the Palestinian Elections
Introduction
Hamas’ surprising victory in the recent Palestinian parliamentary elections—the first democratic elections to date—have raised a number of questions, not least due to the steep rate of the movement’s success and its sheer unstoppable rise to power. These questions relate to Hamas’ future policy, the next developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the very existence of the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, it seems that Hamas itself is unprepared to handle such an overwhelming victory, and there are signs that the need to compose the Palestinian government by itself with no significant partners puts the movement before significant challenges.
Hamas’ success of in free elections should be viewed as a landmark event taking place within the context of the highly-developed Palestinian public opinion, pluralism, and sense of democracy—a political culture quite unique in the Arab region. The elections were also regarded as another step in the U.S. campaign for the promotion of democracy in the Middle East, in line with the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, the
parliamentary elections in Iraq, and the U.S. pressures towards the parliamentary elections in Egypt.
The democratic process in the Arab world began in 1992 with the first free elections in Algeria, in which the Islamic front of FIS won the majority. This was followed by elections in Jordan, where the Islamic Action Front of the Muslim Brotherhood seized over one third of the seats. The Egyptian elections in December 2005, meanwhile, strengthened the power of the Muslim Brotherhood there, despite the substantial efforts by the authorities to limit the Brotherhood’s potential power by means of massive waves of arrests and policies of intimidation. The Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood—the Islamic Party—supported the elections in Iraq, despite the controversy over them in the Sunni community, and the many attacks against its members and its platform by the various Jihadi insurgent groups.
In the past fifteen years it has become almost an axiom to say that free democratic elections in the Arab world give rises to the Islamic elements vis-à-vis the nationalist ones. One of the primary reasons for that is the ideological vacuum in the Arab world, where Islamism, especially that extolled by the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, is the only ideology left. In addition, Arab governments and publics find themselves in a crisis as illustrated by a sense of social injustice perpetuated by the ruling classes, as well as almost apocalyptic sense in the course of which the old Brotherhood’s slogan—Islam is the ultimate solution (al-Islam hua al-Hall)—has infiltrated large segments of Arab societies. Thus far, the Palestinian elections seem to close the circle of a process that started in Algeria, in which Islamic movements defeated liberation movements through democratic means, as illustrated by the Algerian FLN and the Palestinian PLO/Fatah.
Al-Qaeda and Hamas
The democratic elections in Iraq and the Palestinian Authority, the semi-democratic elections in Egypt, and especially the role of the United States on one hand and of the Brotherhood on the other, have also generated controversy and an ambivalence over the attitude towards “Western” democracy among Jihadi-Salafi circles too. Moreover, Al-Qaeda, global Jihad, or Jihadi Salafiyyah, pose a threat not only to the West or to local governments, but also to mainstream Arab Islamic movements belonging to the school of the Brotherhood. In the case of Iraq, Jihadis seem, as of now to have a consensus against the participation in the democratic processes, no matter what form this process may take on. That said, the success of Hamas—a Jihadi movement, even if focused locally and only against Israel—has posted some question marks.
These question marks are not new but rather a product of ongoing ambivalence towards Hamas in the past three to four years.1 On one hand, Hamas has conducted most of the terrorist activity against “the Jewish State” while adhering to Jihadi tenets. It also served as a model of Jihadi sacrifice in the form of the suicide bombings and its martyrs (Shuhada). On the other hand, however, Hamas has been viewed as part of Palestinian nationalism, conducting a “Jihad for the Homeland” instead of a “Jihad for Allah.” For many supporters of global Jihad, Hamas is also an obstacle in the way of infiltration of Al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Authority. It is a movement that cooperates with Shi`i Iran and Hizballah; that defended Yaser Arafat until his death in November 2004; and that, more recently has shown signs of regression in its policy by accepting and keeping its promise of a period of truce with Israel. Hamas is also an integral part of the Muslim Brotherhood, a harsh rival in the eyes of Jihadi-Salafists, with a political and social doctrine that we might call “evolution, not revolution.” The Brotherhood also has a strong tendency to support, at least tactically, democratic processes in the Arab world in which its prospects to win look promising.
Jihadi-Salafiyyah and Democracy
Islam’s interaction with democracy is of key importance for Jihadi-Salafi groups since opposing democracy in the Western form in general, and rejecting man-made laws in favor of the principle of Divine Law in particular, is perceived as a sacred doctrine. Power derived from human beings rather than from Allah is an obvious heresy—Kufr. In recent years, the question of the legitimacy of elections became more controversial as more and more Muslims living in the West too questioned the religious legitimacy of participating in Western elections. Books on this topic, especially those opposing participation of Muslims in democratic processes, are now translated by Salafi scholars and groups into English.2 Given the American campaign to bring democracy to the Arab world, Jihadi-Salafi groups view democracy not only as a heresy, but also as an integral part of the new “Crusader” campaign of colonialism—al-Hamlah al-Salibiyyah al-Jadidah—and the historical conspiracy against the Muslim world. This worldview is supported by more moderate Islamic elements in the Arab world, especially Saudi and Egyptian mainstream clerics and scholars, and has also been controversial also around the recent Iraqi elections.
We should also bear in mind that democracy is also a threatening prospect for most Arab governments, be they kingdoms or republics. Conservative nationalist scholars perceive democracy in terms of “Western political-cultural imperialism,” a heritage of past periods where the Soviet Union and Arab socialism have been influential in the region. Furthermore, in many Arab countries, where Islamic movements are leading the opposition and hence, are oppressed, they are also the leading advocates for civil rights, starting from the Algerian FIS to the Saudi Islamic reform movement.
There are several famous Jihadi-Salafi edicts—fatwas—have been issued against democracy and parliamentary elections. Supporters of global Jihad have made intensive use of these fatwas in order to criticize the Palestinian elections in general and Hamas’ participation in particular. On 18 January 2006, the webmaster of Al-Maqrizi Center in London, which is headed by the Egyptian Islamist Dr. Hani al-Siba`i, posted on the Jihadi forum Al-Hesbah a list of names of 102 Islamic clerics, some of whom are already dead. All of them severely opposed any participation in parliamentary elections in the Muslim world.3 The list was meant to influence the Palestinian Hamas not to take part in the elections. The list featured the names of 52 Egyptians, 22 Saudis, 5 Jordanians (among them “Sheikh” Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi), 5 Syrians, 4 Moroccans, two Sudanese, two Lebanese, two Kuwaitis, as well as one Iraqi, Nigerian, Mauritanian, and Yemeni each. The dominant share of Egyptians and Saudis reflects their significant role in the development of Jihadi Salafiyyah, as a result of the integration between Egyptian exiles from the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi scholars there.
Four were Palestinians, with no links to Hamas or the Brotherhood, among them two interesting individuals—Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani and Abd al-Qadim Zaloum, the founders and first two leaders of the Islamic Liberation Party (Tahrir Party). Another past Tahriri leader—Ahmad al-Da`our—is listed among the Jordanian clerics. This is interesting because in the debate over the elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, supporters of Jihadi-Salafiyyah for the first time bestowed a sense of legitimacy on the Tahrir Party and its positions against democracy and elections. In recent weeks, the Tahrir Party has published and distributed several pamphlets in the Palestinian Authority and on its web sites, calling for the boycott of the Palestinian elections, as well as those in Iraq. Several prominent members of the party took part in the debates in Jihadi forums and were welcomed for their stance regarding elections.
The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) Herzliya, ISRAEL http://www.e-prism.org 5