Je hoeft niet als een homo prive berichten te sturen.. Val blanken lastig die in thaimarokko je familie koopt voor een paar dirham..Geplaatst door TeslaX
Je moet ons niet vertelen dat Erdo en schurkije enkel mondje houden en bukken voor hun Amerikaanse meesters. Dat weet iedereen al hoor.
Stinkturk zat me uit te schelden via pm omdat ik zijn verzonnen verhalen heb ontkracht.
Je kk moederLiegen zit in jullie aard hé mongolische beesten, ga je ontkennen dat je me zat te pmen stinkturk? Niet zoals in schurkije waar elke Rus een een turks gezin pakt voor een lira.
Arme weerloze koerdjes in de bergen bombaderen en al 20 jaar moeite hebben met een verot millitiegroepje als pkk en gayparades organiseren daar zijn de anatoliers de best in.
Turkse grootspraak.
Dat hebben we wel vaker kunnen zien.
Hoe staat het met de sancties tegen Nederland?
Wanneer komen de bewijzen tegen Gulen?
En wat vreemd dat Reza Zarrab nu ineens niet meer de
beste vriend van Erdogan is.
Dat Jeruzalem gedoe, komt Erdogan maar wat goed uit.
Wat dan praten ze tenminste niet meer over Reza Zarrab.
Putin zegt spring, en Erdogan vraagt hoe hoog.
En ik begrijp dat media en realiteit niet meer samen
gaan in het Turkije onder Erdogan.
hou op met je domme onzin, turkije wacht een moeilijk tijd, het wordt een soort iran afgesloten van de buiten wereld, en zodra syrie stabiel wordt gaan ze provincie hatay opeisen die door turken wordt bezet
Wat een bangerik is die erdogan .
Erdogan, Putin strike diplomatic pose in Ankara
Amberin Zaman December 11, 2017
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Article Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan met today in Ankara, where grandstanding alongside Putin is helping cement Erdogan’s image as a Muslim leader with a real hand in global affairs.
SPUTNIK via REUTERS/Alexei Druzhinin
Russian President Vladimir Putin (C, front) and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan (L, front) walk during a meeting in Ankara, Turkey Dec. 11, 2017. Sputnik//Sputnik via REUTERS
Turkey is the scene of a flurry of high-level diplomatic traffic this week with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ankara today to hold talks with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The two leaders will have tackled a broad range of bilateral matters, notably the conflict in Syria, energy and defense projects as well as the dispute over Jerusalem. The pair were all smiles as they posed for the media ahead of a banquet held in Putin's honor at Erdogan's sprawling presidential complex. At a news conference held in its wake, Erdogan announced that a highly controversial deal to purchase Russian made S-400 missiles would be finalized this week.
Head of US Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel and head of US European Command Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti were also due in town later this week to discuss Syria and NATO-related business with Turkish Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar in a bid to defuse tensions over American support for Syrian Kurds affiliated with rebels fighting for Kurdish self-rule inside Turkey.
Turkey is planning to host an emergency session of the Jeddah-based Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Wednesday to hammer out a joint strategy in the face of the United States’ decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Erdogan has led the chorus of Muslim fury against the move, which pro-government media outlets claim was made with Saudi Arabia’s blessings. If true, it’s unlikely that the OIC will rally behind Erdogan, as many of its members rely on Saudi patronage.
It’s just as unclear whether Russia and Turkey can jointly do anything about Jerusalem. But grandstanding alongside Putin certainly helps cement Erdogan’s image as a Muslim leader with a real hand in global affairs.
The meat of the Erdogan-Putin meeting will likely be Syria, where UN-led efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the six-year-long civil conflict remain elusive as ever. Western diplomats express skepticism about the success of the current round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva between the opposition and the Syrian government, which shows little appetite for any compromise.
Another obstacle is the absence of the main Syrian Kurdish opposition group, the Democratic Union Party (PYD). Turkey’s continued resistance to the PYD’s presence coupled with the fact that one of the main stakeholders, the United States, has no relations with either the regime or another critical actor, Iran, make a solution that much harder to achieve.
Prior to his scheduled visits first to Cairo and then Ankara, Putin made a surprise stop today at the Hymemim air base in Syria, where he told Russian servicemen that he had given orders to bring them home. “Over slightly more than two years, the Russian Armed Forces have routed together with the Syrian army the most combat-capable grouping of international terrorists,” Putin said. “In view of this, I have made a decision: Most of the Russian military contingent staying in the Syrian Arab Republic is returning home to Russia.”
Some analysts speculate that the announcement was calculated in part to lean on the goatishly obdurate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, the routing of combat-capable terrorists in Syria, as Putin put it, is by no means over and least of all in Idlib, where jihadis assembled under the banner of the al-Qaeda linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continue to prevail.
Turkey’s cooperation in extinguishing the continued threat posed by HTS to the Assad regime is a key pillar of a separate peace initiative known as the Astana process, which brings together Turkey, Iran, Russia and representatives of the Syrian government and the armed opposition.
The talks, which kicked off in the Kazakh capital Astana last May, call for the establishment of so-called de-escalation zones allowing for a cessation of hostilities and the delivery of humanitarian relief to beleaguered civilians stuck there. The talks are set to resume in Astana for an eighth time on Dec. 21. A possible exchange of prisoners and of the remains of combatants will also be taken up in this round.
The details of any deal struck between the parties remain opaque. Turkey was expected to deploy peacekeepers along lines of contact between HTS and the regime in northern Hama, eastern Idlib and southern Aleppo, amid scattered hopes that they would loosen the jihadis’ grip. Instead, Turkish forces escorted by HTS militants took up positions just south of the Kurdish-controlled enclave of Afrin in mid-October, apparently to prevent the Syrian Kurds from moving further west.
Sam Heller is a Beirut-based fellow with the Century Foundation who has written extensively about the Syrian conflict. In a recent paper he contended, “Turkey’s intervention is — to my best reading, and per the evidence to date — based on a problematic, politically unpalatable compromise. To secure Turkish interests and safeguard at least some of Idlib’s residents, Turkey has apparently partnered with [HTS]. … By engaging Tahrir al-Sham’s mostly Syrian leadership, Turkey may be working to flush the northwest of transitional [jihadis] and al-Qaeda hard-liners who refuse to cooperate. Or, less charitably, it may just be looking after Turkish concerns and working with the local partner closest at hand.”
As the Syrian Kurds see things, Turkey will not relinquish its leverage over Idlib so as to continue wresting concessions from Russia over the PYD. A commander for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces that is backed by the United States predicted in a WhatsApp exchange with Al-Monitor that Erdogan would press Putin further today to allow Turkey to intervene against the Kurds in Afrin. Akar will likewise urge Votel to end the Pentagon's support for them.
Setting aside the Kurds' well-grounded worries, Heller acknowledged in a telephone interview with Al-Monitor that Turkey’s strategy may also be the least rotten option when it comes to averting full-scale conflict between the regime forces and HTS. Such an outcome would send millions of more refugees toward Turkey’s borders or worse, result in a bloodbath.
“In its most ambitious form,” Heller noted, Turkey’s role would be to insert itself between HTS and regime forces. But doing so would pose a dilemma for the jihadis, for whom “surviving under Turkish auspices and fighting jihad against the Assad regime are incompatible.”
Untangling such contradictions won’t be simple, and ad hoc deals rather than grand compromises will likely continue to be the order of the day.
Correction: Dec. 11, 2017. An earlier version of this article said Gen. Votel was due to arrive in Ankara today. Rather, he is expected to arrive later this week.
Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...#ixzz5134vOHnL
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ori...gan-talks.html
Met zijn baasje.
Als je besluit om te gaan dansen met de duivel in het bleke maanlicht. Let wel dat de duivel beslist wanneer de dans stopt en niet jij
Turkey, Russia will meet to finalize S-400 defense deal in coming week
Reuters Staff
2 Min Read
ANKARA (Reuters) - Turkish and Russian officials will meet to finalize Turkey’s S-400 surface-to-air missile systems deal in the coming week, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Monday.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin attend a news conference in Ankara, Turkey, December 11, 2017. Murat Cetinmuhurdar/Presidential Palace/Handout via REUTERS
Turkey has been negotiating with Russia to buy the system for more than a year. Washington and some of its NATO allies see the decision as a snub because the weapons cannot be integrated into the alliance’s defenses.
Turkey expects to receive its first such system in 2019, defense Minister Nurettin Canikli said in November adding that the deal includes two S-400 systems while one was optional.
“Our officials will come together in the coming week to finalize the S-400 issue,” Erdogan said during a joint news conference with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.
Turkey has been working to develop its own defense systems and equipment and has lined up several projects for the coming years including combat helicopters, tanks, drones and more.
Erdogan also said Ankara and Moscow were on the same page regarding the U.S. move on Jerusalem and added that two leaders would keep in contact on the issue. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-t...-idUSKBN1E52F7
Als je besluit om te gaan dansen met de duivel in het bleke maanlicht. Let wel dat de duivel beslist wanneer de dans stopt en niet jij
Russia, Turkey to sign credit agreement in military-technical cooperation sphere - Putin
Business & Economy
December 11, 23:20 UTC+3
Russian president hopes "it will be signed in the soonest possible time"
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ANKARA, December 11. /TASS/. Russian president Vladimir Putin said on Monday he sees good prospects for military technical cooperation with Turkey.
"We see significant prospects for expansion of cooperation in the military-technical sphere. We finalized the credit agreement during today’s work and I hope it will be signed in the soonest possible time," Putin said after talks with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
According to Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, all the details had been discussed. "All loan terms have been agreed, the document will be signed soon," he said, adding that first tranches would be made shortly after the signing.
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http://tass.com/economy/980373 http://tass.com/economy/980373
As the Russia-Iran-Turkey alliance expands, the US is reconciled to a lower profile
Qatar has become the alliance’s newest member, thanks to a rash move by the Saudi Crown Prince.
As the Russia-Iran-Turkey alliance expands, the US is reconciled to a lower profile
From left: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during a trilateral meeting on Syria in Sochi on November 22. | Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/AFP
Dec 09, 2017 · 09:30 pm
Dilip Hiro
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Kaleidoscopic changes in West Asia have produced a constellation of power posing fresh challenges to the United States. The emerging alliance among Russia, Iran and Turkey gained its newest member in Qatar, thanks to a rash move by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. Most alarming for America: Turkey is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s easternmost member with the second largest military in the defence partnership. Qatar provides the Pentagon’s Central Command with its forward base, the region’s largest.
The alliance is by no means the result of expediency. The elements undergirding it – geopolitical, economic and ideological – have long been in the making. It has been helped sharply by President Donald Trump’s muddled foreign policy, a contrast from the coherent policies of the Obama administration with its commitment to democracy and human rights. Trump’s repeated statement before foreign assemblies – “We are not here to lecture you [on] how to run your countries” – is too vague to form the base of Washington’s policy in international affairs. Even that mantra fails when Trump lectures Iran’s elected rulers on how to govern. Iran’s strategic importance was highlighted on November 27 when Turkey, Iran and Qatar signed an agreement naming Iran as transit country for trade between Qatar and Turkey. The move undermines Saudi efforts to isolate Qatar.
On the world stage, the triad of Moscow, Tehran and Ankara has made its mark by acting as prime mover to end Syria’s long-running civil war. But their economic interests have been in play for more than two decades and geopolitical considerations have a longer history.
Qatar joins the club
This is also true of Qatar. Since his bloodless 1995 coup against his father Emir Khalifa Al Thani, Emir Hamad Al Thani has focused on ensuring that his tiny sheikhdom does not become a vassal of Saudi Arabia. To give Qatar a high international profile, he set up the Al Jazeera television channel in 1996, staffed largely by BBC-trained journalists. When the Saudi ruler refused to let the Pentagon use its state-of-the-art airbase near Riyadh for its air campaign against Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks, Hamad struck a secret agreement to let the Pentagon use the Al Udeid airbase, reinforcing Qatar’s links with Washington to deter Riyadh from attempts to dominate the emirate.
To supplement this strategy with a regional power outside the Arabian Peninsula, Hamad signed a defence-industry cooperation agreement with Turkey in 2007 and a military training agreement in 2012. The next year, he abdicated in favour of his son Tamim. In March 2015, the parliament in Ankara passed the Turkey-Qatar Military Cooperation Agreement. Four months later, Tamim informed Saudi King Salman of the true extent of the accord – basing 3,000 Turkish troops in Qatar for training and joint exercises. The monarch reportedly welcomed the deal as a counter to Iran’s growing regional influence.
Almost two years later, with the ascendancy of Prince Bin Salman in Riyadh, the Saudi-led axis of four Arab countries demanded that Qatar “immediately terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar”. The demand backfired. Ankara sent more troops to Qatar, and its tanks rolled through Doha, lending political and moral support to Qatar. The top demand of the Saudi-led Axis for Qatar – “Curb diplomatic ties with Iran and close its diplomatic missions” – ignored a critical economic element. The emirate shares a vast gas field in the Gulf with Iran.
Iran-Russia ties
Overall, Saudi Arabia has ignored Iran’s geopolitical strength. Iran has shorelines on the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Caspian Sea and shares land borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iraq. It has ample reserves of oil and gas. It shares a fluvial border with Russia in the Caspian Sea. In August 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s government signed a contract to construct and operate a civilian nuclear plant near the Iranian city of Bushehr. After long delays, the facility started producing electricity in 2013. Later, Iran and Russia signed an agreement to build two new nuclear reactors at the Bushehr site, with an option of six more at other sites.
During protracted negotiations between Tehran and six global powers on Iran’s nuclear programme, Russia favoured a moderate line in contrast to the hard line advocated by France with the United States taking a middle position.
Military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran started in 2007 when Iran inked the $900-million contract for five Russian S-300 missile batteries. Delivery started three months before the landmark July 2015 deal on Iran’s nuclear programme, with Russia shipping an upgraded version of the S-300. In September of that year, Russia intervened militarily to bolster President Bashar al Assad of Syria where Iran had been aiding his government with weapons and armed volunteers in the civil war. This led to Moscow and Tehran regularly discussing military planning for Syria.
Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Assad share the view that groups raising arms against an established government must be termed terrorists. Strategically, Putin was keen to maintain a base in the Syrian port of Tartus to maintain a Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean.
In November 2015, Putin attended the summit of Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Tehran. While meeting with Putin, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly praised his interlocutor for “neutralising Washington’s plots”, adding that economic relations between the two countries could expand. To his delight, Putin relaxed an export ban on nuclear equipment and technology to Iran. In an unprecedented gesture, Tehran let the Kremlin use its Hamadan military base to launch aerial strikes on a range of targets in Syria in August 2016, enabling the Russian air force to cut flying time for warplanes and increase payloads. The following April, Sputnik News reported that Moscow and Tehran were considering the sale of Russian fighter jets to Iran and a joint venture for Iran to manufacture Russian helicopters under licence.
Turkey and Russia
For Russia, events in Turkey also moved in its favour. In September, Turkey strayed from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s protocol when President Reçep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Ankara had transferred money to pay for Russia’s S-400 missile system. A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation official admitted that the alliance had not been informed about the deal’s details. Dismissing possible NATO objections, Erdoğan declared, “Nobody has the right to discuss the Turkish republic’s independence principles or independent decisions about its defence industry.”
Turkey ranks 17th in the world for gross domestic product, yet has no energy resources of its own while sharing borders with hydrocarbon-rich Iran and Russia. As early as 1996, Turkey signed a natural gas contract with Iran starting at 2 billion cubic meters in 2002. In 2008, Turkey and Iran inked a memorandum of understanding on natural gas production and export. This envisaged Turkey investing in the development of Iran’s gigantic South Pars gas field and pipeline construction to deliver Iranian gas to Europe via Turkey and also supply the Turkish market.
Once the United Nations and the European Union lifted sanctions on Iran in January 2016, there was a spurt in Turkey’s imports of Iranian oil. During the first seven months of 2017, Turkey imported 7.4 million tonnes of crude, up from 3 million tonnes for the corresponding period in 2016.
In February, Putin ratified a deal to build the 1,100-km Turkish Stream pipeline, foreseeing three decades of Russian-Turkish collaboration, to transport Russian gas across the Black Sea into Turkey and southern Europe. The news came weeks after the successful co-chairing of peace talks for Syria’s civil war by Russia and Turkey, backed by Iran, in the Kazakh capital of Astana. On the eve of Trump’s inauguration in January, Moscow sent a last-minute invitation to the United States. The incoming administration sent its ambassador in Astana as observer. After Trump moved to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Erdoğan warned that the United States is “plunging the region and the world into a fire with no end in sight”.
By design or happenstance, Washington is reconciling itself to a lower profile in the fast-changing geopolitics of Eurasia. In contrast, the planned congress of all Syrian groups in the Russian resort of Sochi in February is set to highlight Moscow’s rising profile in the strategic region.
This article first appeared on YaleGlobal Online.
https://scroll.in/article/860744/as-...-lower-profile
Turkey, Russia may sign S-400 purchase deal this week: minister
Reuters
ANKARA:, December 14, 2017 17:00 IST
Updated: December 14, 2017 17:00 IST
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[Russian S-400 Triumph/SA-21 Growler medium-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems drive during the Victory Day parade at Red Square in Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2015.]
Russian S-400 Triumph/SA-21 Growler medium-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems drive during the Victory Day parade at Red Square in Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2015. | Photo Credit: Reuters
An agreement on Turkey purchasing S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia may be signed this week, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Thursday.
Speaking at a joint news conference with his Maltese counterpart Carmelo Abela, Cavusoglu also said technical work on setting up the S-400 systems would begin with Russia. President Tayyip Erdogan also said last week the deal with Russia would be finalised this week.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/interna...le21663830.ece
https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/wh...-syrian-kurds/
Why is Turkey Silent on Russia’s Cooperation with the Syrian Kurds?
Gönül Tol
December 19, 2017
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan never misses an opportunity to swipe at the United States for its cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish militia, the YPG (People’s Protection Units), a key U.S. ally in the fight against ISIL. On an almost daily basis, he slams Washington for “giving weapons to a terror organization” and declares U.S. policy to be a violation of the NATO treaty. When Brett McGurk, the U.S. official responsible for coordinating the international coalition against ISIL, visited YPG members in the Syrian town of Kobane and posed for the cameras with Kurdish commanders, Erdogan asked the United States to “choose between us or the terrorists.” The Turkish foreign minister said he should be sent home while pro-government columnists called for his detention.
But when it comes to Russian support for the YPG, Ankara is mute. Neither Erdogan nor other top ruling party officials uttered a word when the Russian commander at the Hmeimim military base and the YPG spokesman appeared before cameras and made a joint press statement. The Russian commander said they were conducting a joint operation against ISIL in the eastern city of Deir ez-Zor. Russian warplanes provided air cover for the YPG while the Kurdish forces protected Russian forces on the eastern side of the Euphrates.
Turkey’s muted response to Russia’s collaboration with the YPG points to an inconvenient truth for the ruling AKP: Ankara has historically been vulnerable to Russia’s Kurdish policy. In the past, it had leverage to keep Moscow in check. But today, Ankara’s hands are tied. Turkey has no leverage to steer Russia away from cooperating with its archenemy. Ankara might hope Moscow will drop the Kurds as the campaign against ISIL begins to draw to a close. But Russo-Kurdish partnership has deep roots that stretch back to the turn of the last century and might last longer than Turkey would like. As American power in the region is perceptibly in retreat, Russia is trying to fill the vacuum. In Moscow’s regional calculations, the Kurds might prove to be more than great fighters. They could provide the Kremlin with further leverage.
Russia’s Deep-Rooted Relations with the Kurds
The Kurds have historically played an important role in Russian efforts to exert its influence in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used the Kurds to bypass America’s containment strategy in the region.
Shortly after World War II, Moscow supported the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan to increase its influence in the region. After the Iranian army crushed the Kurdish forces, the fighters led by Mustafa Barzani took refuge in the Soviet Union.
In Iraq, Moscow used the Kurds as a trump card not just against Washington but also against Baghdad. The Soviets supported Kurdish demands for national autonomy. Throughout the 1950s, when Moscow had an opponent in Baghdad, this support became a lever to keep the central government in check. But even in the case of pro-Soviet governments that followed the 1958 revolution, Moscow wanted to preserve the Kurdish trump card. In the 1960s, Moscow led international efforts at the United Nations charging Iraq with conducting a genocidal war against the Kurds. In 1970, Moscow mediated between Baghdad and the Kurds to sign a peace agreement that provided for the autonomy of Iraqi Kurds. After 1973 when the Kurds adopted an openly pro-Western stance due to growing ties between the Iraqi and Soviet governments, the Soviets supported Baghdad’s war against the Kurds, which generated demand for Soviet weapons. No matter which direction they leaned, the Kurds served as Moscow’s leverage in Baghdad.
During this period, the Soviet Union established close relations with Turkey’s Kurds as well. In the 1970s, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was established as a Marxist-Leninist and Kurdish nationalist organization. The works of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin became the “main, if not the only, ideological sources of the PKK’s assumptions, beliefs, and values.” After the extensive repression that followed the 1980 military coup in Turkey, many PKK members left the country for Syria, a close Soviet ally, where they received considerable support from the Hafez al-Assad regime. Moscow provided material support and training through their proxies but the political support to the PKK was public.
After the Cold War, Russia kept the Kurds as a trump card to exert pressure on Turkey. In an effort to close its widening foreign trade gap and fill the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey sought to cultivate closer ties to the new republics in Russia’s backyard. To restrain Turkey’s influence, Moscow played the Kurdish card.
The 1990s were marked by the height of Turkey’s war against the PKK that had been waging an insurgency against the Turkish state since the 1980s. To exert pressure on Turkey, in the mid-1990s, Russia entertained the possibility of establishing a Kurdish parliament-in-exile in Moscow. In 1995 and 1996, Moscow held several international conferences featuring organizations close the PKK. Turkish media even circulated reports that the PKK set up a camp in Moscow where the militants were receiving military training.
Turkey responded in kind. During those years, Russia was waging its own fierce war against Chechnya. In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, separatists in the newly formed Russian Federation Republic of Chechnya launched a coordinated campaign for independence, which led to two bloody wars. Russia opposed Chechen independence, arguing Chechnya was part of Russia.
Chechens enjoyed strong support in Turkey. During the first Chechen war that started in 1994, Turkey hosted exiled Chechen warlords. Turkish mayors who were members of the Islamist Welfare Party provided medical aid for the Chechen guerrillas. There even emerged calls within Turkey’s Islamist and nationalist circles for a military intervention in Chechnya to support their war of independence. Both Turkish media and Russian officials argued that Turkey was channeling financial and military aid to Chechnya through Turkey-based Chechen organizations. The most notable was the Chechen-Caucasus Solidarity Association, which was reported to have some 10,000 members in Turkey. Russian officials repeatedly asked the Turkish government to close down these organizations and stop sending volunteers and weapons to the Chechens.
This culminated in a protocol agreement to “prevent terrorism” in 1995. Russia agreed not to allow the PKK to set up organizations in Russia. In return, Turkey promised that it would not support the Chechen cause. Despite the agreement, the distrust remained in bilateral ties.
Moscow and Ankara decided to open a new chapter in bilateral ties at the turn of the century. In 2005, Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi and reached an agreement to support each other’s positions on Chechnya and the Kurds. For a while, frictions over the Kurdish issue seemed to be dissipating.
Als je besluit om te gaan dansen met de duivel in het bleke maanlicht. Let wel dat de duivel beslist wanneer de dans stopt en niet jij
